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Although 1995 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the birth of the
United Nations, the year also marks the fifth anniversary of a newly
revitalized Security Council. In this period of five years, scholarly
debate on the Security Council has shifted from what it might do if it
could act to what substantive limits, if any, exist on the Security Coun-
cil's authority to act under the Charter. The legitimacy of the Security
Council's authority under the Charter arises both in its initial determina-
tion of when it can act and in its determination of the appropriate scope
of its actions once it has involved itself in an international dispute.
Given the wide ranging scope of situations that might fall within the
undefined parameters of a "threat to the peace" under Chapter VII, and
the even more discretionary language of Chapter VI,2 it is not surprising
that on this anniversary much of the focus for reform of the Council has
involved the procedural checks on Security Council decisionmaking -
specifically, membership in the Council, voting procedures, and the veto
power.3 Concerns about the legitimacy of Security Council action most
often arise when it appears that its decisions are driven by the more
powerful veto-holding states of the Security Council, particularly the
United States, rather than reflecting a global consensus that Security
Council action is necessary or advisable. 4 On the other hand, as Profes-
sor David Caron recently noted, there is no denying that the United
States' resources are the linchpin to effective implementation of Security
Council directives, at least with respect to collective actions.'
* Marshall-Wythe Foundation Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary
School of Law; LL.M., University of Illinois College of Law (1984); J.D., Duke Law School
(1978); B.A., Vassar College (1975). The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of
Raj Bhala and Gunther Handl on earlier drafts of this article.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
2. Id. art. 34.
3. See, e.g., John M. Goshko, U.N. Moves Toward Redesign of Security Council, WASH.
POST, Oct. 29, 1995, at A11.
4. See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 565-66 (1992).
5. Id. at 563-65.
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New models for membership and reform of the veto are not the only
methodologies that can strengthen the perceived legitimacy of Security
Council actions. If the overriding concern of the global community is
that the Security Council is responsive to the concerns of a select group
of states rather than that of the community, another avenue of reform
would be to utilize the Security Council more effectively in addressing
new types of concerns widely shared by the community. One such easily
identifiable set of concerns revolves around the threat and effects of
environmental disasters. These are concerns that are shared by devel-
oped and developing countries alike, although the sense of helplessness
in responding adequately to an environmental disaster is perhaps more
acutely felt in developing countries.6
In 1991, the United Nations Environmental Programme ("UNEP"),
in response to mounting disquietude over environmental security, estab-
lished the United Nations Center for Urgent Environmental Assistance
("UNCUEA") to assess and respond to man-made environmental emer-
gencies in cooperation with other United Nations agencies. 7 In April
1993, the executive director of UNCUEA submitted a report summariz-
ing and evaluating its activities and experiences.' On May 21, 1993,
UNEP's Governing Council decided to extend the experimental period
of UNCUEA until June 1994, during which time the Center was to
identify specific needs of c6untries faced with different types of envi-
ronmental emergencies, analyze the ability of the United Nations and
other organizations to respond, review the major disasters of the last ten
years to identify gaps in responses to them, and develop concrete pro-
posals for an enhanced international response capacity focusing on the
United Nations system in particular.9 Following that decision, an adviso-
ry meeting of developed and developing countries was held in Novem-
ber 1993 to discuss the future role of the Center.'" In the course of that
meeting there was much discussion of a report based upon responses to
a questionnaire that had been sent to all developing countries. The report
concluded that many developing countries had no ability to respond to
environmental emergencies. In fact, a routine chemical accident in a
developed country could escalate to a major disaster in a country with-
6. See infra text accompanying notes 10-15.
7. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 79th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 77, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/217 (1992).
8. 1993 U.N.Y.B. 812, U.N. Sales No. E.94.I.1.
9. Id.
10. Advisory Meeting Discusses UN Role in Combatting Environmental Emergencies
HE/834, Nov. 24, 1993 at 1, available online at URL <gopher:/lgopher.undp.org:70100/
uncurr/press_releases/HE/93_1 1/834> [hereinafter Environmental Emergencies].
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out the knowledge or equipment to deal with the situation." The report
noted anxiety that as industrialization increased throughout the develop-
ing world, so would the environmental risks, particularly the risk of
chemical disasters. In response to the questionnaire, more than fifty
countries said they needed the aid of the United Nations to respond to
the growing number of chemical accidents that were polluting water,
killing ecosystems, and endangering human health.' 2 Most countries said
they needed rapid access to information on the dangers of the chemicals
to humans and the environment as well as procedures for containing and
cleaning up chemical accidents. 13 The case studies and report noted that
inappropriate action by poorly informed response teams could actually
make matters worse than the original emergency. 14 Although help was
available from countries on a bilateral basis, several countries indicated
that they simply did not know what assistance was available or whom
they should call.'5
The report also referenced the findings of three independent consul-
tant studies. These independent studies predicted that environmental
emergencies were likely to increase in both frequency and magnitude in
the developing world as industrialization and population increased.' 6 The
report determined that the ideal system to cope with accidents was for
countries to be self-sufficient. Until that time, however, it emphasized
that there was a serious need for practical support from the international
community.' 7 Alain Clerc, the Center's coordinator, contended that there
was a fundamental need for developed countries to show solidarity with
the developing world and help them to cope with the inevitable acci-
dents.' The Center aimed to fill some of the gaps in communication by
extending the twenty-four hour response "switchboard" at the Geneva-
based Department of Humanitarian Affairs ("DHA") to allow developing
countries to phone the United Nations directly for advice in responding
to a chemical emergency.' 9 The switchboard would be supplemented
with a register of international expertise and specialist equipment from
participating developed countries who were prepared to send their
resources to a country facing an environmental disaster. The plans of
11. Id.




16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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UNCUEA called for training in chemical emergency management, the
provision of manuals in a form suitable for initial response, and encour-
aging countries to help each other through bilateral agreements. 20
UNCUEA's Geneva-based secretariat would also draw on information
coming from other UNEP activities, including the International Register
of Potentially Toxic Chemicals ("IRPTC"), the secretariat to the Basel
Convention on Transboundary Shipment of Toxic Waste, and programs
of the International Program on Chemical Safety ("IPCS"). 2' The report
noted that there is no targeted United Nations capacity to respond to
environmental emergencies on land, and that surely it is not necessary to
wait for "another Bhopal" to help the countries who need it most.
22
On December 21, 1993, on the recommendation of the Second
Committee on economic and financial issues, the General Assembly
adopted without a vote a resolution inviting governments, related orga-
nizations of the United Nations system, and other relevant entities to
review their contribution to international cooperative efforts in environ-
mental monitoring and to provide appropriate support for such activi-
23ties. Despite these calls for expanded United Nations involvement in
responding to environmental emergencies, UNCUEA was ultimately
dissolved in 1994 and its responsibilities were transferred to a joint
UNEP and Department of Human Affairs project, denominated the Joint
UNEP/DHA Environment Unit.24 The first meeting of its Advisory
Group on Environmental Emergencies was held in January 1995. A
multinational team, organized under the Unit's auspices, assisted Russia
in assessing the harm from the massive oil spill in the Republic of
Komi.25
Momentum for the United Nations' involvement in responding to
environmental emergencies is not limited to developing countries. In
April 1992, in a follow-up conference to the 1992 United Nations Con-
ference on the Environment and Development, Switzerland advocated
the establishment of a "Green Cross" organization to provide assistance
in environmental disasters in much the same way as the Red Cross cur-
20. Id.
21. Continued U.N. Emergency Response Role in Environment Disasters Backed at
CONFAB, Nov. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Bnaied File.
22. Environmental Emergencies, supra note 10, at 3.
23. G.A. Res. 192, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 86th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 99(a), at 2,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/192 (1993).
24. On-Line Interview with Isabelle Prudon, United Nations Department of Humanitarian
Affairs (Dec. 13, 1995) (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
25. Id.
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rently does with humanitarian aid.26 A French news report at the time,
however, noted that the Swiss government seemed unlikely to offer the
project much backing, and that third world governments might be reluc-
tant to delegate such responsibility for environmental affairs to a devel-
oped western nation.27 In May 1992, Germany and Switzerland (support-
ed by thirteen other countries) proposed the creation of National Envi-
ronmental Task Forces, called "Green Helmets," to respond to environ-
mental emergencies. This proposal was made at a follow-up meeting of
the fifty-two nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) held in Helsinki. Under this proposal, the CSCE countries
would set up national environmental task forces that would serve as the
basis for coordinated international assistance within the framework of
UNCUEA. The CSCE countries would also be obliged to give the
Center information on potentially hazardous installations in their own
territories. Supporters of the proposal included Bulgaria, Canada, Den-
mark, Spain, France, Greece, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland,
Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Ukraine. The Netherlands and Norway also
provided their support, but said that the forces should be given even
more responsibilities and power than suggested in the proposal.28
In March 1989, representatives of twenty-four countries adopted the
Hague Declaration. 29 While only evaluating two global threats - global
warming and ozone depletion - the Hague Declaration nevertheless
asserts that:
[t]he right to live is the right from which all other rights stem.
Guaranteeing this right is the paramount duty of those in charge of
all States throughout the world....
Therefore we consider that, faced with a problem the solution
to which has three salient features, namely that it is vital, urgent
and global, we are in a situation that calls not only for implementa-
tion of existing principles but also for a new approach, through the
development of new principles of international law including new
26. Swiss Environmentalists Would Like to See "Green Cross", Agence France Presse,
Apr. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
27. Id.
28. Green Helmets Proposed for Europe, Agence France Presse, May 20, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File.
29. The signatories to the Hague Declaration are the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Ivory Coast, Australia, Egypt, Brazil, Spain, Canada, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malta, Norway, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, Tunisia, Netherlands,
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Hague Declaration on the Environment, Mar. 11, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
1308 (1989).
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and more effective decision-making and enforcement mecha-
nisms.3
UNEP is hampered by a limited secretariat, a relatively small budget, a
headquarters (in Nairobi) distant from most of the agencies it coordi-
nates as well as the United Nations decisionmaking centers in New York
and Geneva, and, most importantly for purposes of this analysis, no
enforcement powers.31 Despite the proliferation of multilateral treaties on
the environment, there is no collective institutional mechanism to coerce
or cajole compliance with the new norms established.
The Security Council has noted its probable jurisdiction and correc-
tive powers over certain environmental conflicts. In a summit meeting of
the Council on January 31, 1992, the Council's final declaration provid-
ed that "[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does
not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military
sources of instability -in the economic, humanitarian and ecological
fields may become a threat to peace and security. ' 32 The analytical
dilemma created in advocating an authoritative role for the Security
Council in any substantive context other than military conflict is that
military conflict, or the threat thereof, is the paradigm upon which the
Security Council's authorization was predicated in the drafting of the
Charter. Whatever might be gained in perceived legitimacy by having
the Security Council activated in an area of universal concern might
well be lost if that authority can only be sustained by forced interpreta-
tion of already expansive terms. Legitimacy is first and foremost depen-
dent upon the legal predicate for Security Council responsiveness.
In a challenging piece on restructuring the international organiza-
tional framework to address international environmental problems, Paul
Szasz wrote in 1992 that the argument for assigning to the Security
Council those matters related to environmental management, particularly
matters dealing with emergency situations or "otherwise serious situa-
tions," has two bases. First, critical environmental problems are "securi-
ty" issues as much as war and peace. Second, the Council is unique in
its power to compel states to comply with its decrees or suffer the
consequences of sanctions.33 Finding both premises unpersuasive, Szasz
30. Id. at 1308-09.
31. See generally Paul C. Szasz, Restructuring the International Organizational Frame-
work, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 340, 352 (Edith B. Weiss ed.,
1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE]; Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make Interna-
tional Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 261 (1992).
32. Szasz, supra note 31, at 360 n.60 (alteration in original).
33. Id. at 359.
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first notes that the original meaning of the language of the Charter as to
what constitutes a breach of peace or threat to peace does not easily
lend itself to addressing environmental emergencies; and that the "classi-
cal rules of treaty interpretation require that in dealing with duties or
burdens imposed on States Parties to a treaty a strict rather than a liberal
construction be applied." 34 Second, he posits that the use of Chapter VII
to deal with environmental concerns would be comparable to "using an
inappropriate instrument to perform a potentially delicate operation -
perhaps it can be pulled off successfully, but it certainly would not be
either the surgeon's or the patient's choice., 35 He does, however, con-
cede that utilization of the Security Council may be more practical than
a treaty assigning true legislative powers to the United Nations or to a
new international organization, or an amendment of the Charter to
explicitly address environmental concerns.36
Despite the references to Chapter VII in this brief passage, Szasz's
focus is on the potential of established United Nations organs to serve
normative needs in environmental management. The argument for such
legislative power under Article 25 and Chapter VII would be predicated
on particular environmentally destructive practices constituting a threat
to peace and the authority of the Security Council to forbid all states
from engaging in that practice.37 The "principal difficulty" in his opin-
ion, however, is that the composition and voting system of the Council
are not suited to environmental tasks:
Even aside from the question whether [the Security Council]
composition and ... system are still appropriate even for the func-
tions for which the Council was originally designed, it would seem
absurd if at this time this completely different function (i.e. envi-
ronmental protection) would be subjected to a system in which the
five states who were the principal victors in the Second World War
(but which do not include two of the most powerful economies,
those of Germany and Japan) would have a veto power over envi-
ronmental enforcement actions. It may indeed by sensible-and even
necessary that any such compulsory powers not be easily exercised
.and that therefore one or more states or groups of states should be
able to prevent such exercise by a veto, but the states and the
particular voting powers that one would assign them would pre-
sumably be quite different from those specified in Articles 23 and
27 of the Charter.
34. Id. at 359-60.
35. Id. at 360.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 360 & n.62.
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Consequently, to the extent that a Charter amendment would
be required to give the Security Council responsibilities in respect
of the enforcement of environmental rules or the prevention of
environmental violations, it would seem more sensible, if it is
desired to vest such powers in a UN organ, to create a new princi-
ple organ for that purpose....
On these several grounds, there is no reason to try to involve
the Security Council either in the process of environmental legisla-
tion or even in considering and debating such issues. Although it is
true that the Council enjoys possibly the highest visibility among
UN organs, it would seem likely that instead of enhancing environ-
mental issues with its prestige it would find its own role dimin-
ished by dealing with matters for which it is clearly unsuited.38
In a landmark article also published in 1992, Sir Geoffrey Palmer ex-
pressed skepticism about the normative authority of any existing interna-
tional organization, as presently structured, to deal with environmental
matters. He favors creation of a new United Nations organ, although he
notes that the procedures for amending the Charter are not "easy" and
are further hampered by the veto option.39 Even in his more modest
proposal to create a new specialized United Nations agency, he predicts
that "[m]any nations, particularly the most powerful and certainly the
United States, are likely to be opposed to creation of such an organiza-
tion[,] ... [given the apparent consensus] that the creation of new
institutions should be avoided when possible."'
In assessing global expectations for the legitimacy of Security
Council authority in environmental management, careful distinction
should be made between the Security Council's putative authority to act
in formulating norms and its authority to recommend or impose remedi-
al or punitive measures on a specific party or parties. The global com-
munity's perception of the legitimacy of Security Council action in these
formats would inevitably differ. The Security Council's agenda and
discussions relative to avoiding or terminating military conflict are
driven by specific, concrete events to which the Security Council re-
sponds. In devising environmental norms, however, the Security Council
would be evaluating certain anti-environmental practices as a general
matter and establishing a norm that either recommends that such practic-
es be discontinued under Chapter VI or prohibits the practices under
38. Szasz, supra note 31, at 361.
39. Palmer, supra note 31, at 280.
40. Id. at 282.
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Chapter VII.4 The difference between the Security Council's normative
functioning in environmental management and its more traditional
functioning with respect to international peace and security under Chap-
ter VI or Chapter VII would be less an issue of practice and more one
of perceived legitimacy. Discussion of a matter in the Security Council
may be limited to a single concrete dispute yet result in a general reso-
lution without reference to the specifics of the dispute or to any specific
parties. In much the same way, evaluation of the permissibility of envi-
ronmentally destructive practices would inevitably involve discussion of
specific factual circumstances and situations although ultimately result-
ing in a general normative resolution. The most important question is
the willingness of the global community to accept the Security Council's
claim to legislative authority, regardless of the substantive context
(environmental or otherwise) in which that authority is asserted.
Legitimization of Security Council authority in environmental man-
agement can and should begin with the relatively modest, but compel-
ling, proposal that environmental emergencies be absorbed into its
sphere of activity. The Security Council was originally devised and
organized to function continuously and to respond to international
emergencies (although, concededly, with respect to military conflict).
Defining what constitutes an "emergency" from an environmental per-
spective is ordinarily difficult. When is a disaster imminent? What is the
interplay between imminency and scientific certainty or lack thereof? In
the circumambiency of reformulating the international organizational
framework to acknowledge the Security Council's emergency authority,
however, an environmental emergency can be presumed to be any action
which creates or threatens significant transboundary environmental
damage or loss of a vital global resource which cannot be adequately
addressed to ensure a safe and healthful environment by any other orga-
nization due to time or authority constraints. In this respect, the prece-
dent set by Security Council action in just the past three years has
dramatically altered the legal foundations for arguing that the Security
Council has legitimate remedial and punitive authority in environmental
emergencies. One need look no further than the 1990 Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait and the Kuwaiti oil fires to conclude that environmental destruc-
tion outside the permissible bounds of the laws of warfare constitutes an
act of aggression, breach of peace, or threat to international peace and
security.42
41. See Szasz, supra note 31, at 360 n.62.
42. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991). See also Linda A. Malone, Discussion in the Security Council on Environmental
Michigan Journal of International Law
In the absence of real or threatened military conflict, can environ-
mental destruction be sufficient to trigger the Council's -Chapter VII
powers? Is a threat to ecological security a threat to international peace
and security? As noted earlier, the Security Council has declared that
"[tihe absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in
itself ensure international peace and security[,] ... non-military sources
of instability in the economic, humanitarian and ecological fields may
become a threat to peace and security. 43 Alexandre Timoshenko makes
a compelling argument for recognition of ecological security as a legal
principle and the need for relevant improvements in the legal and insti-
tutional order to address such concerns, attributing the concept of eco-
logical security to leaders and diplomats from the former Soviet Union
and Eastern European countries."
According to Timoshenko, the concept of ecological security provides
a needed methodology for environmental protection in several respects:
Firstly, ecological security makes environmental protection a
problem of human survival, reflecting the seriousness of existing
and future ecological threats. It gives the problem the highest
priority traditionally attributed to security matters. It introduces a
new basis for resolving environmental problems - the "forecast-
and-prevent" model -' instead of the usual "react-and-correct"
model. It creates an opportunity to redistribute resources allocated
for security in favour of environmental tasks, thus it may help to
solve the problem of reconverting the military sector of national
economies.
Secondly, ecological security envisages that the obligation to
create the relevant legal and managerial regime will be placed upon
the international community as a whole, which coincides with such
general trends in international law as collective responsibilities and
obligations erga omnes.
Thirdly, being a component of the comprehensive security
system, ecological security functions in conjunction with other
elements (military, political, economic, and humanitarian). This not
only creates a needed correlation between ecological security and
other global problems, but also conditions the achievement of a
synergistic effect.
Intervention in Ukraine, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 893 (1994); Margaret T. Okorodudu-Fubara,
Oil in the Persian Gulf War: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 123, 216-17 (1991).
43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
44. Alexandre S. Timoshenko, Ecological Security: Response to Global Challenges, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 31, at 413.
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And lastly, the security approach in the environmental field
serves to integrate related concerns under a common rubric. Securi-
ty has often served as a strong motivation for integration. The
universal collective security system under the United Nations
Charter and regional security systems like NATO or the Warsaw
Treaty illustrate this. This integrative force greatly enhances the
efficiency of environmental protection. This has been clearly dem-
onstrated by the European Communities.45
However appealing this equation of ecological security and military
security might be for purposes of Chapter VII, parity of these concerns
could lead to expanded assertions of state authority to engage in unilat-
eral or collective measures. Otherwise illegitimate intervention and use
of armed force could be cloaked as ecological self-help or self-defense.
This would undermine the Charter's restrictive authorization of armed
force by states in Article 51.46 Although recognition of ecological securi-
ty under Chapter VII does not necessarily .open a Pandora's box, the
danger of abuse merits consideration of other analytical frameworks.
When environmental degradation seems to threaten international
conflict between states or takes place in an ongoing military conflict,
there would be no need to resort to a separate notion of ecological
security in order to trigger authority in the Security Council under
Chapter VII. Furthermore, Article V of the 1977 Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques directs states to file a "complaint" with the
Security Council if there is reason to believe the treaty is being violat-
ed.47 States are additionally required to cooperate in any investigation
45. Id. at 432-33. From a political perspective, Timoshenko notes that:
ecological security can be considered in three dimensions. The first derives from
the environmental threat to political and economic stability. The second is based on
the assumption that the inter-state disputes, arising from transboundary pollution or
abuse of one's right to use shared natural resources, may develop into military
conflicts. The third originates from the supposition that overreaching ecological
imbalances may cause severe disruption of major natural processes that are
indispensible to human existence on the planet.
The first two dimensions are primarily of a national and regional scale. The
last and the most serious one has global implications. The best available example
of the third dimension of ecological security is global climate change.
Id. at 422-23.
46. Nico Schrijver, International Organization for Environmental Security, 20 BULL.
PEACE PROPOSALS 115, 116 (1989).
47. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmen-
tal Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, art. V, 3, 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 I.L.M. 88.
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the Security Council initiates,48 and are presumably subject to the enforce-
ment powers of the Council under Chapter VII for non-compliance.
In the milieu of deliberate environmental destruction or ecocide, the
General Assembly has a pivotal role to play. The definition of "aggres-
sion" adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 is con-
fined to the use of military force.49 Although ecocide may be deemed a
threat to peace or breach of peace, such intentional and hostile manipu-
lation of the environment should be added to the list of acts of aggres-
sion found in Article 3.
Absent real or potential military conflict, there are many conceivable
scenarios in which the state of origin of an environmental disaster might
be unwilling to cooperate with the Security Council, thereby exacerbat-
ing the transboundary effects of an environmental disaster and jeopardiz-
ing the lives of its own populace by refusing to cooperate with the
international community in remedial action. In such circumstances, the
traditional notion of a threat to international peace and security would
not justify invocation of Chapter VII in the absence of an ongoing
conflict between states or a realistic threat of such conflict. The concept
of ecological security is more compelling in these circumstances because
the traditional analysis is deficient. The full implication of recognizing
ecological security as a basis for Security Council action merits further
consideration of alternative justifications. Once again, recent exercises of
the Security Council's Chapter VII powers have resulted in more expan-
sive interpretation of the concept of a "threat to the peace" than previ-
ously was the case.
Security Council enforcement action with respect to preservation of
human rights and relief efforts is analogous to Security Council enforce-
ment action to protect individuals from environmental catastrophes. For
example, the humanitarian mission to Somalia,50 the economic sanctions
and authorization of a multinational force for Haiti,5' the placement of
48. Id. 14.
49. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314
(1975). The General Assembly addresses environmental management in its overburdened
Second Committee on economic and financial issues. It has issued a resolution giving specific
programmatic and administrative guidance to UNEP in preparation for environmental emer-
gencies. G.A. Res. 217, supra note 7. Of course, it also convened the 1972 Stockholm
Conference on the Human Environment from which UNEP originated and the 1992 Rio
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).
50. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 314th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992).
51. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 328th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841
(1993).
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relief operations in Iraqi territory for the Kurdish population 2 and the
establishment of the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda5 3 and
the former Yugoslavia 4 are examples of humanitarian intervention by
the Security Council in order to remedy gross and systematic depriva-
tion of human rights. Gross and systematic deprivation of human rights
is no more within the original intent of the term "threat to the peace"
than environmental preservation. Although each of these precedents
(with the notable exception of Haiti) can be legitimized by pointing to
the background conflicts present, such a position would ignore the
humanitarian justifications given in the relevant resolutions for the
Security Council's actions. These examples indicate that the Security
Council members, and the global community, are at least somewhat
receptive to a policy-oriented, constitutive approach to interpreting the
Charter even when such interpretation expands the obligations and
duties of member states and undeniably goes beyond the original intent
of the Charter. At the same time, the financial difficulties of the United
Nations appear to have increased resistance to creating new organs.
These practical considerations make the prospects dim for creation of
new organs to protect the environment, intensifying the need for the
Security Council to take an expansive and active role within the powers
it possesses.
Any analogy to the Security Council's exercise of humanitarian
intervention under Chapter VII is complicated by the fact that, under
international law, there has yet to be clear and unequivocal recognition
of a right to a safe and healthful environment.5 This lack of recognition
52. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991).
53. S.C. Res. 995, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/995
(1994).
54. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
55. See W. Paul Gormley, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1976); Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991); Gudmundur Alfredson & Alexander Ovsiouk, Human Rights
and the Environment, 60 NORD. J. INT'L L. 19 (1991); Noralee Gibson, The Right to a Clean
Environment, 54 SASK. L. REV. 5 (1990); W. Paul Gormley, The Legal Obligation of the
International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansion of
Human Rights Norms, 3 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 85 (1990); W. Paul Gormley, The Right
to a Safe and Decent Environment, 28 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1988); W. Paul Gormley, The
Right of Individuals to be Guaranteed a Pure, Clean and Decent Environment: Future Pro-
grams of the Council of Europe, I LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 23 (1975); Gunther
Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly "Revisionist" View, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 117 (A. Cancado
Trindade ed., 1992); Iveta Hodkova, Is There a Right to a Healthy Environment in the
International Legal Order?, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 65 (1991); R.S. Pathak, The Human Rights
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is particularly troublesome in that whatever authority the Security Coun-
cil might have under Chapter VII, the scope of its activities is confined
by the stated purposes of the United Nations in Article 1.56 Article 1
explicitly mentions human rights as one of the fundamental purposes of
the United Nations, coextensive with the maintenance of international
peace and security. Absent a threat to military peace and security or
recognition of the concept of ecological security, legitimacy of any
Security Council measures to protect the environment on humanitarian
grounds will be attenuated so long as there is no explicit and clear
recognition of a fundamental right to a safe and healthful environment.
It is unfortunate that UNCED did not take this critical step forward. 7
Indeed, the Rio Declaration's repeated proclamation of the sovereign
right of a state to exploit its own resources is less supportive of a corre-
lation between environmental preservation and human rights than the
earlier Stockholm Declaration. 8
The inextricability of environmental preservation and human rights,
as well as the need for Security Council involvement in environmental
management, is well illustrated by the controversy over the execution of
environmental activists in Nigeria. As this article was going to press,
Nigeria's military government received widespread censure from the
global community for hanging nine persons, including the well-known
System As a Conceptual Framework for Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 205 (Edith B. Weiss ed.,
1992); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment,
28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991); Dinah Shelton, The Right to Environment, in THE FUTURE
OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN A CHANGING WORLD: FIFTY YEARS SINCE THE FOUR
FREEDOMS ADDRESS, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF TORKEL OPSAHL 197 (Asbjorn Eide & Jan
Helgesen eds., 1991); Heinhard Steiger et al., The Fundamental Right to a Decent Environ-
ment, in TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 1 (Michael Bothe ed., 1980); Melissa
Thorme, Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 301
(1991); Henn-Juri Uibopuu, The Internationally Guaranteed Right of an Individual to a Clean
Environment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 151
(Richard P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1989); David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA.
L. REV. 599 (1995); Jennifer A. Downs, Note, A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environ-
ment: An Argument for a Third Generation Right, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 351 (1993);
James T. McClymonds, Note, The Human Right to a Healthy Environment: An International
Legal Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583 (1992); cf. World Charter for Nature, U.N.
GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 23, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4 (1982); World Charter for Nature
Addendum, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 21, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4/Add.l (1982); see
generally Andrzej Makarewicz, La protection internationale du droit i l'environnement,
ENVIRONNEMENT ET DROITS DE L'HOMME 77, 79-82 (Pascale Kromarek ed., 1987).
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
57. See generally Dinah Shelton, What Happened to Human Rights at Rio?, 3 Y.B.
INT'L ENVTL. L. 75 (1992); Wirth, supra note 55.
58. Wirth, supra note 55.
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playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of a movement for the survival of
the Ogono people.59 Saro-Wiwa was charged with involvement in the
killings of four pro-government traditional chiefs during disturbances
against the Anglo-Dutch oil giant Royal Dutch/Shell in May 1994. The
Ogonos, an ethnic minority concentrated in southeastern Nigeria, ac-
cused the government of allowing the oil-rich communities, farms, and
fisheries to be destroyed due to lack of environmental safeguards. Saro-
Wiwa stated that "[w]hat Shell has done is to wage ecological war
against the Ogoni people." 6 Five days after the executions, the Royal
Dutch/Shell group announced that it intended to invest $3.5 billion in a
natural gas plant in Nigeria.6' On December 14, 1995, the General
Assembly's Social, Humanitarian and Cultural committee, by a vote of
98 to 12 with 42 abstentions, condemned Nigeria's '.arbitrary" execution
of the nine activists. 62 The United States and European Union introduced
the resolution with nearly sixty additional sponsors.63 Voting against the
resolution were China, which viewed the resolution as illegal interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of Nigeria under the guise of human rights,
and a number of African countries.6 At that time, imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions by the Security Council appeared to be blocked by
China's veto power.65 Unilaterally, the United States banned all military
sales to Nigeria, extended a ban on U.S. visas to all members of the
military and supporting civilians, and restricted Nigerian United Nations
delegates to a twenty-five mile radius of Manhattan. 66 The United States
refrained from imposing a unilateral ban on imports of Nigerian crude
oil, presumably because the effects would be felt 'by the population and
not the military leaders.67
If economic sanctions against Nigeria were placed on the Security
Council's agenda, what would constitute the threat to peace? The politi-
cally motivated execution of nine individuals, although a denial of
59. Stephen Buckley, Nigeria Hangs Playwright, Eight Activists, WASH. POST, Nov. 11,
1995, at Al.
60. Id. at A26.
61. Daniel Southerland, Shell to Invest In New Nigeria Gas Venture, WASH. POST, Nov.
16, 1995, at A39.
62. John M. Goshko, Nigeria Draws UN. Censure For Executions, WASH. POST, Dec.




66. Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Eschews Tough Measures In Wake of Nigeria Hangings,
WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at A2.
67. Nations Rule Out Oil Sanctions Against Nigeria, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1995, at
A17.
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human rights, would not be equivalent to the gross and systematic
deprivation of human rights which have been the grounds for humanitar-
ian intervention by the Security Council in the past. If the predicate for
economic sanctions is the underlying conflict between the Ogonos and
the Nigerian government, that conflict is an "ecological war" as de-
scribed by Saro-Wiwa. Of course, nothing would preclude the Security
Council from characterizing the threat to peace more cautiously as the
gross and systematic deprivation of the political rights of the Ogonos in
general, just as the undeniable human rights motivation behind sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia in 1965 was initially cloaked in the more
acceptable justification of potential military conflict. Nevertheless, the
Nigerian incident and the Security Council's response (or non-response
for that matter) demonstrates the inevitability of environmental disputes
being thrust into the Council's province.
The stumbling block to Security Council responsiveness to the
Nigerian situation was the objection of the People's Republic of China
that humanitarian concerns of any kind would be used to justify Security
Council authority. To return to Paul Szasz's comments68 on the inappro-
priateness of environmental tasks for the Security Council, the veto
power and, more broadly, the composition of the Council are problems
which are superimposed on the entire range of issues which might fall
within the Council's jurisdiction. To rework his analogy, the problem is
not the inappropriateness of the instruments for the operation but the
choice of doctors who decide on the patient's course of treatment. In an
emergency situation, however, the patient cannot simply wait for the
ideal decisionmakers to be assembled and authority to be distributed
accordingly. As necessary and preferable as it might have been to have
an international criminal court or explicit authorization of humanitarian
intervention in Chapter VII, it was necessary for the Security Council to
establish ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and to
act in those situations, as well as in Haiti, Somalia, and Iraq. China's
restraint in the use of the veto in these precedents provides at least a
glimmer of hope for the effectiveness of the Council in addressing
environmental emergencies.
Assuming that the Council is authorized to respond to environmental
emergencies, what form might the response take? With emergencies,
corrective action could be either remedial (as in requiring Iraq to com-
pensate for environmental damage) or punitive (as in imposing econom-
ic sanctions on Nigeria). Remedial measures would be those designed to
68. See supra note 38.
[Vol. 17:515
Winter 1996] Security Council Authority in Environmental Emergencies 531
rectify the effects of a single incident or discontinue a particular practice
while punitive measures would be designed to compel discontinuance of
environmentally, destructive behavior.
For punitive measures, economic sanctions under Article 4169 would
be a likely response to environmental transgressions. Collective imposi-
tion of economic sanctions through the Security Council would obviate
many of the practical and legal difficulties with the unilateral imposition
of trade sanctions. Briefly, unilateral imposition of economic sanctions
is permissible, if not prohibited, by the 1947 GATT and Uruguay Round
agreements which encompasses 125 countries (excluding, notably, the
former Soviet Union and most of the Eastern bloc countries, China and
Taiwan). Under the Uruguay Round agreements, environmental mea-
sures that are service and product-related are covered by the sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations ("SPS Agreement"). In case of a violation of a
relevant agreement, objecting states must resort to the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding ("DSU") procedures of the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO") for imposition of economic sanctions. This dispute resolu-
tion system involves, progressively, direct bilateral negotiation, concilia-
tion, and finally a WTO panel determination with ultimate recourse to
the entire WTO on the panel determination. If a state does not comply
with an upheld panel determination that invalidated an economic sanc-
tion, the restricted state and other parties to the dispute are authorized to
retaliate proportionately with trade sanctions. This whole system, from
the first bilateral negotiation to a final WTO determination, may take
twelve to eighteen months.
70
As widespread as participation in GATT and the Uruguay Round
agreements is, its membership is not as inclusive as the membership in
the United Nations, particularly given the notable exceptions mentioned
above. Moreover, as expedited as the evaluative process now is under
the Uruguay Round agreements, the process still takes too long to
correct an environmental emergency that threatens significant and immi-
nent environmental disaster or military conflict. Finally, the procedures
only apply to products and, to a much lesser extent, service-related
environmental disputes - it does not encompass a wide range of envi-
ronmental disputes such as transboundary pollution, destruction of or
disputes over allocation of a vital environmental resource, or loss of
biological diversity. States would still retain the option of unilateral
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
70. See generally Norio Komuro, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Coverage and
Procedures of the WTO Understanding, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1995).
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imposition of trade sanctions in accordance with their treaty obligations
even if the Security Council did not decide to impose sanctions.
The availability of economic sanctions through the Security Council
would be a particularly effective remedy for environmental delinquen-
cies. Whatever effectiveness economic sanctions have in avoiding or
terminating military conflict. or in remedying human rights violations,7'
economic sanctions are potentially more effective as a deterrent or
sanction in the environmental context (at least those that do not them-
selves involve potential or ongoing military conflict). Military conflict
inevitably implicates security interests that defy economic quantification
and which continue unaffected by economic deprivation. Economic
sanctions for human rights -violations. often harm only those whose rights
they are meant to protect while leaving the offending power structure
unchanged. National productivity of any kind at the expense of the
environment, however, can be more easily translated into economic
terms. Consequently, it is easier to tailor appropriate economic sanctions
to deter or to punish the excessive or hazardous exploitation of resourc-
es. Although some environmental delinquencies will implicate vital
security concerns even in the absence of real or potential military con-
flict (hazardous plutonium-producing nuclear reactors, for example), a
wide range of environmental problems would fall outside of these more
troublesome parameters. Moreover, this argument is not meant to sug-
gest that economic sanctions for environmental delinquencies are inap-
propriate or unworkable in the context of real or anticipated military
conflict or when concrete national security concerns are implicated. It is
meant only to acknowledge that in such circumstances concerns about
the effectiveness of economic sanctions are the same as in a non-envi-
ronmental context.
Remedial measures by the Security Council could range from rec-
ommending that member states provide assistance to alleviate the emer-
gency to requiring the state of origin to monitor, assess, report on,
and/or redress the environmental damage through restoration of resourc-
es or financial compensation.72 Although at first glance it might seem
unlikely that the use of force under Article 42 would be an appropriate
response, there are conceivable scenarios, aside from environmental
destruction threatening military conflict or in ongoing military conflict,
71. Lor F. Damrosch, Recent Security Council Actions Concerning Internal Conflicts:
Economic Sanctions, ASIL INSIGHT (Am. Soc'y of int'l L., Washington, D.C.) Jan.-Feb.
1994.
72. For a description of United Nations monitoring and informational activities in
environmental emergencies, see infra note 79.
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in which the use of force might become necessary.73 Drawing from the
Certain Expenses case,74 enforcement action under Chapter VII is char-
acterized by lack of consent. Placement of United Nations or United
Nations-authorized personnel - military or technical - in a state with-
out its consent would arguably constitute enforcement action under
Chapter VII. It has also been suggested that the Security Council could
create subsidiary organs under Chapter VII and Article 2975 of the
Charter to deal with specific disputes, such as global warming, 76 al-
though this methodology is more useful for norm-creating and adjudi-
catory functions than for responding to emergency situations.77
In the event of an environmental disaster in which the victim state
or states requests the assistance of the Security Council, the language of
Chapter VI ("any dispute, or any situation which might lead to interna-
tional friction or give rise to a dispute")78 is even broader and more
anticipatory than the term "threat to the peace" under Chapter VII. The
Security Council has well established procedures for emergency sessions
and in such circumstances could expeditiously recommend to member
states provision of emergency assistance. The Security Council could
also act as a clearinghouse for such emergency assistance, or designate
another organ of the United Nations to supervise in an ongoing capacity
73. For one such scenario, see Malone, supra note 42 (describing investigation by IAEA
experts of the conditions at Chernobyl).
74. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 150, 164 (July 20)2
75. U.N. CHARTER art. 29.
76. Jose L. Fernandez, Global Warming Legislation: Putting the Carbon Genie Back In
the Bottle, 42 SYRAcUsE L. REV. 1095, 1153-54 (1991).
77. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") is competent to adjudicate all international
law disputes, including environmental disputes. The ICJ also has the authority to establish
special chambers with specific expertise under Article 26(1). Advisory opinions may also be
requested from the ICJ by the General Assembly and Security Council, as well as other duly
authorized United Nations organs and agencies. U.N. CHARTER arts. 65, 96. The principal
impediments, however, to utilization of the ICJ to resolve environmental disputes, are the
difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction over state parties and the time-consuming process of
adjudication. See Charles E. Di Leva, Trends in International Environmental Law: A Field
With Increasing Influence, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10076, 10078 (1991). It has been suggested
that a special environmental court be established by treaty or by the General Assembly. See
id. at 10081-82. Although a number of. ICJ decisions have been influential in the devel-
opment of international environmental law, the Court now has the first truly environmental
case to come before it involving Hungary and Slovakia.
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 34. Consensual utilization of the Security Council for peaceful
settlement of environmental disputes under Chapter VI is consistent with the code of guiding
principles for peaceful settlement of disputes over shared natural resources adopted by the
UNEP Governing Council and the General Assembly. G.A. Res. 186, U.N. GAOR, 34th
Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/186 (1979); Draft Principles of Conduct in
the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious
Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States: Report of the Intergovern-
mental Working Group of Experts, U.N. Environment Programme, 6th Sess., Provisional
Agenda Item 11, Annex at 13, U.N. Doc. No. UNEP/GC.6/17 (1978).
Michigan Journal of International Law
and coordinate the assistance provided by member states. 79 The recent
proposal to establish a rapid deployment force under Article 40 80 could
also be utilized as a model for a team of environmental disaster experts
"on call" to the Security Council to assist in the interim period during
which member states are organizing their own assistance efforts. The
creation of such a team would be considerably less expensive than the
creation of a new, separate organ.
One limitation that applies to responsive measures under Chapter VI
but does not apply to Chapter VII "enforcement measures" is Article
2(7)'s prohibition on intervention in states' domestic jurisdiction.8 If a
state consents to the measures of the Security Council under Chapter VI,
then there is no problem of "intervention" under Article 2(7). If, howev-
er, the state in which the environmental problem originates is uncooper-
ative, the Security Council, instead of resorting to Chapter VII, might
choose to issue precautionary and ameliorative recommendations for
emergency response action applicable only in the territory of consenting
states, but which could nevertheless be interpreted by the state of origin
as "intervention" in its domestic jurisdiction. For example, routine
monitoring or exchange of information on the transboundary effects of
an environmental disaster, if taken pursuant to a Security Council rec-
ommendation that there be such collection and exchange of information,
might be objectionable to the state of origin. In this regard, it is relevant
to note that Russian counter-intelligence agents recently accused a
79. With respect to monitoring and information systems, UNEP, pursuant to its
Earthwatch Programme, has established the Global Environmental Monitoring System
("GEMS") in which four specialized agencies, the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources ("IUCN"), and over 140 states participate. UNEP is also
responsible for INFOTERRA, an international clearinghouse for exchange of environmental
information, the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals ("IRPTC"), and the
International Programme on Chemical Safety ("IPCS") in conjunction with the International
Labor Organization ("ILO") and the World Health Organization ("WHO"). See Szasz, supra
note 31, at 343.
80. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-keeping, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10, 44, U.N. Doc. A/47/277
(1992); John H. Goshko, Boutros-Ghali Seeks Standby Force to Prevent Massacre in Burundi,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1996, at A22; see generally Rosalyn Higgins, Peace and Security:
Achievements and Failures, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 445, 451 (1995); Andrew S. Miller, Universal
Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and the Legal Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773 (1993).
81. Article 2(7) provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
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"[w]estern ecological organization of divulging military secrets and...
suggested that foreign environmental groups are fronts for espionage." 2
Environmental disasters with transboundary effects, loss of a vital
global resource, or actions in violation of international environmental
law can no longer be regarded as matters of "domestic" jurisdiction. An
interpretation of "domestic" jurisdiction that excludes environmental
disasters with international ramifications is as consistent as the current
widespread recognition that "domestic" jurisdiction does not encompass
the large scale deprivation of basic human rights.83 Veto-holding states
could block any unwelcome intrusion into what they perceive as their
domestic concern. Although other countries would view this power as a
drawback to recognizing Security Council competence in environmental
emergencies (and rightly so), developing countries in particular could
benefit from, rather than be disadvantaged by, Security Council assis-
tance, as the UNCUEA report indicates8 4 Moreover, intervention in a
truly domestic matter would in all likelihood fail to receive the required
nine votes given the traditional geographical distribution of membership,
regardless of whether the Security Council was acting pursuant to Chap-
ter VI or Chapter VII. It should also be noted that the Article 2(7) issue
would not arise with respect to areas outside of any state's territory, for
example, on the high seas,85 and, though less clear, in Antarctica.
In the absence of collective United Nations machinery, the opportu-
nity for states to resort to self-help in an abusive and unprincipled way
continues. Few authorities question that environmental issues and alloca-
tion of scarce natural resources will be a predominant issue on the
82. Lee Hockstader, Ecologists Accused of Espionage, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1995, at
A26.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 10-22.
85. On the high seas, the Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Case
of Oil Pollution Casualties and its 1973 Protocol Relating to Pollution by Substances Other
Than Oil already authorize states to take necessary measures to protect themselves from grave
and imminent danger resulting from maritime casualties. Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 970
U.N.T.S. 212; Nov. 2, 1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 13 I.L.M. 605 (1974). Generally acknowledged
as reflecting custom, this right of intervention could be the legal foundation for a Security
Council recommendation that states exercise the right individually or collectively. The
Security Council's authority in dealing with environmental emergencies on the high seas
would enhance, not detract from, the new organizational framework for peaceful resolution of
certain specified disputes under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea which, as noted
earlier with the ICJ, see supra note 77, is dependent upon the cooperation of the parties
involved and inevitably time-consuming in its process. Moreover, the 1982 Convention lends
support to the Security Council's less intrusive utilization of its Chapter VI powers by
directing all states in Article 279 to seek peaceful resolution of disputes pursuant to Charter
Articles 2(3) and 33(1). By offering the ICJ as one of the four fora for a binding resolution of
disputes, the Convention also opens up the possibility of Security Council enforcement of ICJ
decisions under Chapter VII, as authorized in Article 94(2) of the Charter.
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international agenda for years to come. Unfortunately, as the report from
UNCUEA indicates, the threat of future Chernobyls and Bhopals is
increasing rather than lessening. However desirable it might be to create
a new international organization to deal with environmental manage-
ment, the likelihood of such an organ at a time of severe budgetary and
bureaucratic crisis within the United Nations seems highly unlikely.
Whatever potential problems there might be for the Security Council as
a norm-creating entity in environmental management, a critical first step
in effective environmental regulation is that serious consideration be
given to the Security Council as an organ for addressing environmental
disasters. The revitalization of the Security Council engenders hope that
the international community is sufficiently mature to accept the Coun-
cil's expansion into environmental management 86 - despite the continu-
ing and pervasive problems with the veto, the Council's membership,
and fiscal constraints.
86. Cf., Palmer, supra note 31, at 260 ("The Charter itself provides no environmental
organ, an omission that would most certainly be rectified if it were being drafted today.").
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